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Abstract
This paper embeds firm dynamics into the Neoclassical model and provides a simple
framework to solve for the transitional dynamics of economies moving towards more selection.
As in the Neoclassical model, markets are perfectly competitive, there is only one good
and two production factors (capital and labor). At equilibrium, aggregate technology is
Neoclassical, but the average quality of capital and the depreciation rate are both endogenous
and positively related to selection. At steady state, output per capita and welfare both raise
with selection. However, the selection process generates transitional welfare losses that may
reduce in around 60% long term (consumption equivalent) welfare gains. The same property
is shown to be true in a standard general equilibrium model with entry and fixed production
costs.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal contributions of Frank Ramsey [41] and Robert Solow [44], and their extensions
by Cass[14] and Koopmans [32], the one sector Neoclassical growth model has become the
cornerstone of modern macroeconomics. Its influence rests to a large extent on its ability to
replicate the salient evidence on economic growth within a simple and stylized framework,
spreading well beyond growth analysis by shaping the study of business cycles, optimal taxation,
and economic policy, among many other fields in macroeconomics. The parsimony and the
simplicity of the model makes it possible to study the dynamics of an economy in response to an
exogenous perturbation —be it a structural shock or a policy reform.
The Neoclassical model builds on, among others, the assumption of a representative firm.
While convenient, this assumption precludes —by construction— the analysis of firm dynamics
and market behavior, at a time where the greater availability of micro-data has shifted attention
towards these problems. Since the seminal contributions of Hopenhayn [24] and Jovanovic [30],
a new, complementary, framework has emerged, explicitly designed to address these latter issues
(See, e.g. Bartelsman and Doms [7] for a review of the empirical literature). The literature on
firm dynamics builds upon the heterogenous behavior of firms and the very idea that selection
plays a fundamental role in explaining market performance. Competition creates and destroys
firms and jobs giving rise to a reallocation process whereby resources are shifted away from the
less towards the more productive firms.
The aim of this paper is to offer a general framework for the study of the transitional
dynamics of general equilibrium models with firm heterogeneity and endogenous selection. It is
designed to easily solve for the response of the economy to exogenous perturbations affecting
the allocation of resources across heterogeneous firms, facilitating the understanding of the
macroeconomic implications of the selection mechanism at work in the firm dynamics literature.
By doing so, we develop a modelling strategy that facilitates the quantitative evaluation of the
transitional dynamics and the associated welfare cost of selection.
A key feature of the general framework suggested in this paper is that it restricts the study
of the dynamics to equilibria where the economy becomes more selective over time. In fact, the
key requirement is that all along the equilibrium path the productivity cutoff is non-decreasing.
This type of solution corresponds to economies facing shocks or policies that promote selection.
Restricting to this family of solutions has the double advantage that all along the transition
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there is no need to compute neither the equilibrium distribution of firms nor their value function,
reducing the system to a standard rational expectations dynamic system defined in the aggregates.
First, for the family of solutions carrying this property, we show that all along the equilibrium
path the productivity distribution of incumbent firms is a linear combination of the initial and
the entry distributions both truncated at the current productivity cutoff —each one weighted by
its share in the total mass of firms. When the economy is initially at a stationary equilibrium, the
equilibrium distribution is, all along the transition path, the truncated entry distribution. Second,
we show that both the entry and exit conditions only depend on current profits. When the
economy is expected to become more selective over time, marginal firms don’t expect their profits
to increase, making current profits a sufficient statistic for the marginal firm’s participation (exit
or remain) choices.
This paper uses the suggested framework for the study of perfectly competitive dynamic
general equilibrium models with firm heterogeneity and selection. Because of its dual genesis,
we dub the main model in this paper the Ramsey-Hopenhayn model (RH in the following). Like
in the standard Ramsey’s growth model, the dynamics of the economy are driven by optimal
savings and capital accumulation, i.e., an Euler type equation governing household savings and
a feasibility set governing investment and capital accumulation. Like in the Hopenhayn model,
firms are heterogenous and the allocation of resources is driven by a selection mechanism. The
source of selection however slightly differs from the seminal Hopenhayn [24] paper. While in the
Hopenhayn model, selection is the outcome of heterogeneity and the presence of a fixed cost of
production, in the RH model selection originates from the interplay between firm heterogeneity
and the partial irreversibility of capital.
In the RH model, as in the putty-clay literature,1 each firm’s technology makes use of a fixed
—partially irreversible— heterogeneous production factor (capital) and a flexible homogeneous
production factor (labor) to produce a single homogeneous final good, that —as usual— can be
either consumed or invested. To make the argument simple, production is assumed to require
one unit of capital. In such a setting, the price of the fixed input acts as an entry cost, which is
assumed to be paid before the firm observes its quality. For the sake of tractability, as in Melitz
[38], the idiosyncratic productivity or quality attached to a particular unit of capital is assumed
to be time invariant, i.e., firms face no other productivity shock than the initial one. When
1See the work of Johansen [27], Solow [45], Sheshinski [43] and Calvo [13], among many others.
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capital’s quality is too low —i.e. below some threshold that is endogenously determined— it is
optimal for the firm to close down and send the capital unit to scrap. The mere existence of this
opportunity cost attached to the partial reversibility of capital is at the core of the selection
process making the least productive firms exit the market. Selection takes place without the
need of any fixed production cost; fixed production costs being at odds with the Neoclassical
model.
Section 3 first describes the behavior of households and firms and then states the key properties
of the general framework. Propositions 1 and 2 characterize the productivity distribution,
showing that all along the equilibrium path it is a linear combination of the initial and the entry
distribution both truncated at the current cutoff productivity. Propositions 3 and 4 characterize
the exit and entry conditions showing that current profits are a sufficient statistic of the value of
the firm when taking market participation decisions. Section 4 studies the Ramsey-Hopenhayn
model. Proposition 6 solves for the equilibrium cutoff and shows that shocks promoting selection
make the cutoff productivity jump at impact to its new, higher stationary value. Propositions
2 and 6 extend to the full equilibrium path the solution in (and the solution strategy used
by) Melitz [38] to solve for the steady state equilibrium. Under some general conditions, the
equilibrium distribution is the truncated entry distribution and the cutoff productivity is constant
and independent on the aggregates. Then, using standard aggregation theory, we show that
the equilibrium aggregate technology is Neoclassical with the average quality of capital being
positively related to selection. This aggregation result is in line, although different in nature,
with aggregation in the vintage capital literature, as in Solow [45] and Solow et al [46], where
different vintage technologies collapse into a Neoclassical production function.2 We then fully
characterize the transitional dynamics of the aggregates.3 By means of a parametrized exercise,
we proceed to illustrate the optimal response of the economy to (i) an increase in the degree
of capital reversibility, which could be interpreted as a policy that increases the scrap value of
2Aggregation of vintages technologies has been extensively used in the more recent literature on
embodied technical progress or investment specific technical change. See the seminal paper by Greenwood
et al [23], as well as the endogenous growth extensions by Krusell [33] and Boucekkine et al [9] and
[10]. Similar aggregation results are pointed out by Hopenhayn [25] when relating the literature on firm
dynamics with the recent literature on misallocation (Restuccia and Rogerson [42], for example).
3In the limit, the RH model encompasses the Neoclassical model in the cases of homogeneous firms
and fully reversible capital.
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capital, and (ii) a policy that reduces investment price distortions. In particular, we show that
shocks leading to a permanent increase in the the productivity cutoff triggers a selection effect
that leads the economy to a higher steady state, but on impact partially destroys the initial
stock of capital. In both cases, we evaluate the welfare costs and benefits of selection at steady
state and during the transition. In our numerical exercise, long term welfare gains are large. A
5% increase in average productivity induces steady state (consumption equivalent) welfare gains
between 1.22% and 2.7%. The transitional welfare costs reduce the steady state welfare gains by
around 60%. In other words, while more selection makes agents better off in the long run, the
short-run welfare losses due to capital destruction are also sizeable. A simplified version of the
Hopenhayn model is studied in Section 5. Section 6 studies selection in the Jones and Manuelli
[28] endogenous growth model. A last section concludes.
2 Related Literature
The literature on capital irreversibility dates back to the seminal paper by Arrow [5], who
assumes that “the resale of capital goods is impossible.” In Arrow [5], investment is a sunk cost.
Abel and Eberly [1] adopt a more general framework allowing firms to resale capital at a price
smaller that its replacement cost. Inspired in Bentolila and Bertola [8], they use option pricing to
characterize the lower bound (and the upper bound) of the marginal product of capital inducing
firms to disinvest (invest). In the RH model, firms are heterogenous in productivity, face no
shocks, and their investment decisions reduce to a participation choice —produce or exit. In
this framework, partial reversibility exogenously determines the selling price of used capital in
the secondary market, and consequently the lower bound in the user cost of capital below which
firms optimally exit. This condition is the equivalent to the exit condition in the Hopenhayn
[24] model of firm dynamics, where a fixed production cost plays the same role as the lower
bound in the user cost of capital in the RH model.4
Irreversibility creates a positive wedge between the user cost of capital and its rental rate as
derived by Jorgenson [29]. This wedge corresponds to an irreversibility premium (see Chirinko
4In Hopenhayn [24] there is no hysteresis in the sense of Dixit [17], i.e., “the failure of an effect of
reverse itself as its underlying cause is reversed.” The fundamental reason is that in Hopenhayn firms
take entry decisions before observing the state of productivity, but in Dixit firms decide whether to invest
after observing the state of demand.
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and Schaller [16]) which appears because some new units of capital are not productive enough to
be profitably used in the production process and are therefore optimally scrapped straightaway.
Otherwise stated, the irreversibility premium relates to economic depreciation. Entry decisions
in the RH model face a similar tradeoff, making the user cost of capital charge an irreversibility
premium at equilibrium, which is decreasing in the degree of irreversibility and increasing in
selection.
In models of firm dynamics, selection is costly since it requires some units of capital —the
less productive ones— to be destroyed. Economic depreciation in models of partial irreversibility
is in line with obsolescence in the vintage capital literature —see Malcomson [37], Caballero and
Hammour [12], Boucekkine et al [11] and Gilchrist and Williams [20], among others. Selection
entails a permanent process of creative destruction, in which low productive firms are substituted
by more productive ones. Since the creative destruction process is efficient, at the stationary
equilibrium the RH model shares most properties of the Neoclassical theory, but endogenous
selection positively affects the value of capital, production and welfare. In the short-run, on
the contrary, selection may require some destruction of the initial capital stock that entails
transitional welfare losses partially compensating the long term gains from selection.
Veracierto [47] studies the business cycle properties of a heterogenous firm model with
exogenous exit and entry, and partial capital reversibility. When triggered by standard aggregate
productivity shocks, Veracierto [47] claims that “business cycles are found to be basically the
same with fully flexible or completely irreversible investment.” Adding endogenous selection to
the picture does not change the Veracierto irrelevance of irreversibility result. In our framework,
capital, output and consumption react to TFP shocks in similar way as in Veracierto [47]
confirming the irrelevance of irreversibility to the understanding of TFP shocks. Different
from Veracierto [47], we study here the reaction of the economy to permanent shocks that by
promoting selection directly affect the creation and destruction process finding that they are
relevant.
Using equipment-level data from aerospace plants transacted in the secondary market, Ramey
and Shapiro [40] find that “even after age-related depreciation is taken into account, capital
sells for a substantial discount relative to replacement cost; the more specialized the type of
capital, the greater the discount.” This finding gives strong support to the assumption in this
paper that capital is partial irreversible. Gavazza [19] concludes that trading frictions in the
7
secondary market for real assets shape capital irreversibility, affecting selection in a similar way
as in the Hopenhayn [24] model. By looking at a large set of industries, Lanteri [34] find similar
results confirming that the market for second-hand capital goods clearly shows that capital
is partial irreversible. In the same direction, Gourio [22] points out that economic downturns
are associated with large reallocation of capital, leading to the loss of firm specific specialized
capital goods as well as intangible capital. More recently, Vinci and Licandro [48] argue that
the observed switching-track of the American GDP that followed the Great Recession is a direct
consequence of a boost in bankruptcies inducing a large destruction of production capacities in
line with Gourio [22] and Lanteri [34] findings.
The scrapping of old equipment and machinery, and their substitution by modern ones is
a fundamental pillar of policies addressed to promote the transition to clean technologies (see
Acemoglu et al [2], among others). Vehicle scrapping schemes are a good example. They were
introduced in the years 2000 in many countries to encourage the substitution of environmental-
unfriendly cars, promoting the modernization of the stock of automobile (see Adda and Cooper
[3], and Licandro and Sampayo [35], among others). These policies were quite effective in the
short run, giving support to the assumption in this paper that policies addressed to increase the
scrap value of capital generate an important destruction of the initial stock of capital.5
3 General Framework
The main objective of this paper is to develop a simple strategy for solving dynamic general
equilibrium models with firm heterogeneity and selection. The suggested strategy does not
require the computation of the equilibrium distribution, neither the value function. Solving for
an equilibrium path then reduces to solving a standard dynamic system defined on the aggregates.
In doing so, we restrict the analysis to transitional dynamics that monotonically converge towards
an equilibrium with more selection. We apply this methodology to the resolution of what we
call the Ramsey-Hopenhayn model, a simplified version of Hopenhayn [24] and an endogenous
growth model with firm dynamics inspired in Jones and Manuelli [28].
This section describes a general framework that encompasses both the Ramsey-Hopenhayn
5Adda and Ottaviani [4] study the role of policies for the transition from analogue to digital television,
which required a large destruction of existing equipment for the emission and reception of television
signals.
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and the Hopenhayn models, and proves some important properties of the equilibrium distribution
and the entry and exit process. These properties will also apply to the endogenous growth model
of Section 6.
3.1 Representative Household
The economy is populated by a unit measure of identical households, each offering inelastically
one unit of labor at any time t. The representative household has preferences over a consumption





where c(t) denotes consumption at time t, and ρ > 0 is the constant subjective discount rate.
The instantaneous utility function u(·) is characterized by a constant intertemporal elasticity of
substitution σ > 0.
Even if firms face idiosyncratic risk, households fully diversify it by buying the market




= σ(rt − ρ), (2)
where rt is the riskless equilibrium interest rate.
3.2 Firms’ behavior and labor market clearing
At any time t, a continuum of heterogeneous firms of endogenous mass nt produces a single
homogeneous final good —used as the numéraire— under perfect competition. For the sake of
tractability, we follow Melitz [38] and assume that firms are characterized by a time invariant
firm specific productivity z drawn at entry from the continuous density function ψ(z), for
z ∈ Z ⊂ R+. Let us denote by ζ and ζ̄ to the lower and upper bounds of the support Z, with
0 ≤ ζ < 1 < ζ̄. Without loss of generality, expected productivity at entry is assumed to be one.
The final good is produced by means of a fixed production factor —capital— and a flexible
production factor —labor.
Entry into the market, and hence production, entails acquiring one unit of capital. Conse-
quently, the mass of operative firms nt is equal to the stock of capital measured in physical units.
Acquiring one unit of capital requires η ≥ 1 units of the consumption good. The larger η, the
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less efficient the economy is in producing investment goods. Accordingly, we will refer to η as an
investment distortion, with η = 1 corresponding to the undistorted economy. Moreover, capital
is assumed to be partially irreversible, in the sense that, when a firm optimally decides to close
down, it only recovers a fraction θ ∈ (0, 1) of the consumption good embodied in this unit of
capital. We will refer to θ as the scrap value of capital, which measures the degree of capital
irreversibility.






where the firm specific production function F (z, `) is C2, increasing in both arguments, concave
and homogeneous of degree one. Variables y(z) and `(z) denote, respectively, output and
employment of a firm with productivity z.6 We interpret productivity z as being embodied in
capital, with different capital units having different qualities.



































where z∗t is the productivity of the marginal firm, i.e. the least productive firm in operation, and
φt(z) is the productivity density function at equilibrium. After substitution of individual labor
demands `t(z) into the labor market clearing condition above, the equilibrium wage rate reads
wt = F2(kt, 1), (6)
where kt = z̄tnt measures capital per capita in quality adjusted units.7 Since a firm requires
6Technology in this paper is in line with the span of control assumption in Lucas [36].
7This way of measuring capital is consistent with national accounts, where after a long debate following
Gordon [21]’s seminal work, investment is deflated using constant quality price indexes.
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one physical unit of capital to produce, and idiosyncratic productivity z measures the quality of





Under the assumption that F21(·) > 0, the wage rate is positively related to capital per capita
k which crucially depends on the average quality of capital z̄t. In other words, selection raises
wages by increasing the average quality of capital.
Substituting the equilibrium wage rate into the labor demand function (5), for all active









The term 1/nt represents average labor per firm. The second term, z/z̄t accounts for the fact
that labor is distributed across firms according to their relative productivity. Equalization of
marginal product of labor across firms implies that more productive firms hire more labor. The
reallocation of input across firms operates here through the intensive margin channel, i.e., high
productive firms employ more workers than low productive firms. Substituting the equilibrium
labor demand above in the production technology (3) and using the definition of capital per
capita, we get












= F (kt, 1)z/kt, since `t(z) = z/kt and F (.) is homogeneous of degree
one. The average production per firm, f(k)/n, is distributed across firms depending on the
relative productivity z/z̄. More productive firms employ more labor and produce more up to
the point where the marginal product of labor equalizes across firms.
3.3 An Informative Guess
This paper focuses on the analysis of equilibria where the cutoff productivity z∗t is monotonically
increasing, converging to its steady state value. This type of equilibrium usually occurs when
a policy is implemented to make the economy more selective. In this context and in order
to solve for the equilibrium path of the Ramsey-Hopenhayn economy in Section 4 and the
endogenous growth economy in Section 6, we rely on a constructive proof (guess and verify)
developed in four stages. In a first stage, we guess (see Guess 1 below) that the path for the
equilibrium cutoff is non-decreasing over time. In a second stage, Proposition 2 uses Guess 1
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to identify a set of sufficient conditions under which the shape of the equilibrium distribution
is independent from the path of the aggregates. In a third stage, Proposition 6 imposes the
conditions identified in Proposition 2 to show that the path of the equilibrium cutoff is indeed
non-decreasing and independent of the aggregates, hereby verifying Guess 1. More precisely,
we prove that under the conditions imposed in Proposition 2 and for the family of solutions
consistent with Guess 1, a solution path for the cutoff productivity z∗t exists and is unique.
Finally, under the assumption that technology is Cobb-Douglas and the entry distribution is
Pareto, for the equilibrium distribution in Proposition 2 and the path of the cutoff productivity
in Proposition 6, Section 4.3 uses a shooting algorithm to solve for the aggregates in the case of
the Ramsey-Hopenhayn model. Similar steps are followed in Section 6 to numerically solve for
the equilibrium path of the endogenous growth economy.
A similar constructive argument is used to solve for the equilibrium of the Hopenhayn
economy in Section 5. We repeat the first two stages above. Then, under the assumption that
technology is Cobb-Douglas and the entry distribution is Pareto, we impose the conditions in
Proposition 2 to show in Proposition 7 that the equilibrium can be characterized as a path
for consumption and capital. We solve for it using a shooting algorithm and find that it
monotonically converges to steady state. Since we are looking for solutions with increasing
selection, the paths for capital and consumption converge to the stationary solution from below.
Then, we use the exit condition to solve for the equilibrium path of the cutoff productivity,
which we found to be monotonically increasing, verifying Guess 1.
Guess 1 The equilibrium path z∗t , for t ≥ 0, monotonically converges from some initial z∗ι ≥ ζ
to the stationary equilibrium z∗, z∗ι < z∗.
To summarize, the constructive argument developed in this paper guesses that the solution
path of the cutoff productivity is non-decreasing —Guess 1— to identify conditions under which
an equilibrium verifying this property exists for all the economies under analysis.
3.4 Productivity Distribution
This section shows some properties of the equilibrium distribution that will prove useful when
studying the dynamics of all models in this paper. One of the main technical problems faced when
dealing with the dynamics of models of heterogeneous firms is that the path of the equilibrium
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distribution generally depends on the path of the aggregates, while the latter also depends on
the distribution.
In a continuous time model where firms draw their (time invariant) productivity at entry
from a known continuous density function, Proposition 1 below shows that, under very general
conditions, at any time t, the equilibrium density is a linear combination of the entry density
and the initial density —both truncated at the current cutoff productivity. The weights of this
linear combination depend on the share of surviving initial firms on the total mass of firms,
which goes to zero as time goes to infinity making the equilibrium distribution converge to the
entry distribution truncated at the stationary cutoff. The main condition required to prove this
result is that Guess 1 holds at equilibrium, which typically occurs when the economy is moving
towards a more selective steady state. The study of the dynamics of the Ramsey-Hopenhayn,
the Hopenhayn and the endogenous growth models in Sections 4, 5 and 6, respectively, will
make use of this property.
If, on top of that, the economy is initially at steady state, the initial distribution is the
truncated entry distribution. As shown in Proposition 2 below, a shock that monotonically shifts
the equilibrium cutoff to the right, makes, at any time, the equilibrium distribution be equal to
the entry distribution truncated at the current cutoff productivity.
Let us develop this argument. Firms exit the market for two different reasons. First, they exit
at the exogenous exit rate δ > 0, which can be interpreted as the rate of physical depreciation.
In which case, their capital cannot be recycled. Second, a firm may endogenously decide to exit
if its productivity is smaller than some cutoff productivity z∗t ∈ Z. For all the models studied in
this paper, when restricting the analysis to the set of initial conditions making the equilibrium
path for z∗t to be non-decreasing, we show in the following sections that, for any time t ≥ 0, there
exists a unique productivity cutoff z∗t ∈ Z such that the distribution of firms at equilibrium has
support [z∗t , ζ̄). This typically corresponds to policies addressed to increase selection.
We follow three steps to derive the law of motion of the equilibrium productivity distribution





with respect to t to obtain ∫ ζ̄
z∗t
φ̇t(z)dz = φt(z∗t )ż∗t ,
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where Φt(z) denotes the cumulative distribution associated to the equilibrium density φt(z). For
ż∗t > 0, the support of the equilibrium distribution reduces, which requires an increase in the
density (on average) in the new (smaller) support to compensate for the fact that firms with
productivity smaller than the new cutoff are exiting.
Second, for z ∈ [z∗t , ζ̄), the equilibrium mass of firms with productivity z is given by ntφt(z),
where nt is the mass of firms at t, evolving as
ṅtφt(z) + ntφ̇t(z) = −δntφt(z) + etψ(z), (8)
where et is the mass of entrants. At any time t, incumbent firms exogenously exit at rate δ, and
new entrants et draw productivity z at rate ψ(z). Integrating (8) with respect to z over the
interval [z∗t , ζ̄), we obtain the law of motion of the aggregate mass of firms








and δt = δ + φt(z∗t )ż∗t . (10)
Surviving new entrants λtnt cumulate into the aggregate mass of firms, at the time that some
firms exit because of physical depreciation δ and obsolescence as measured by φt(z∗t )ż∗t . Solving
the ODE (9) for some initial mass n0 > 0, the mass of firms is then given by
nt = n0Λt, (11)




measuring cumulative entry net of physical and economic depreciation.







λt − δt + δ
)
φt(z). (12)
Firms exogenously exit at rate δ, and because of the reduction in the mass of firms the distribution
truncates at the rate δt − λt. The velocity with which the past distribution is substituted by
the entry distribution depends on the entry rate et/nt. Since the differential equation (12) is
valid only for z ≥ z∗t , otherwise φt(z) = 0, the path for z∗t critically determines the equilibrium
distribution φt(z).
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The next two propositions characterize the equilibrium distribution when equilibrium is
restricted to solutions verifying Guess 1, i.e., those where the economy becomes more selective
over time (z∗t is non-decreasing). Proposition 1 studies the general case of an arbitrary initial
distribution φι(z) while Proposition 2 specializes to the case of an economy initially at a stationary
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Under Guess 1, if the initial distribution φι(z) is continuous in the support
















is the ratio of surviving initial firms to total firms.
Proof : If z∗t is non-decreasing, with z∗0 ≥ z∗ι , the solution to the ODE (12), for z ∈ [z∗t , ζ̄), is















ds = Λ−1t e−δt.








Substituting it back into the solution for φt(z), then using (11) to substitute for Γt, we obtain (13), which
completes the proof.
Proposition 1 establishes that, at any time t, the equilibrium density distribution of produc-
tivity across operative firms is given by the weighted average of the initial density φι(z) and
the density at entry ψ(z), both truncated at the cutoff productivity z∗t . The weights are given
by the shares of surviving initial and new firms in the total mass of firms, i.e. those that enter
before and after t = 0, respectively.
Proposition 2 Under Guess 1, if the initial distribution is φι(z) = ψ(z)1−Ψ(z∗ι ) in the support






Proof : Under Guess 1, z∗t is monotonically increasing, with z∗0 ≥ z∗ι . Therefore, we have


















Substituting this result into (13) we get (14), which completes the proof.
Proposition 2 states that if the initial equilibrium distribution corresponds to the truncated
entry distribution, and the cutoff value z∗t is in the support of the initial distribution and
shifts monotonically to the right, then the equilibrium distribution, at any time t, is the
entry distribution ψ(z) truncated at the current cutoff productivity z∗t . The rationale behind
Proposition 2 is simple. Shall firms be initially distributed with the same profile as the entry
distribution, then the productivity of the new comers is drawn from the same distribution, pilling
up over a distribution of incumbents with exactly the same profile.8 Hence, the shape of the
equilibrium distribution is invariant, but the lower bound of the support may shift to the right
changing the truncation point. As we will show in the following sections, Proposition 2 holds for
economies that are initially in steady state and face an unexpected shock making them more
selective.
Average Productivity. Under the conditions of Proposition 2, the average productivity level







which only depends on z∗t . This property will be used in the following sections.
Pareto Distribution. In the sequel, in accordance with the empirical evidence, the entry
distribution will be assumed to be Pareto with tail parameter κ, κ > 1, and unbounded support
ζ̄ =∞. The assumption that the expected productivity at entry is one, implies that ζ = κ−1κ .
Under the conditions of Proposition 2, it is easy to show that the equilibrium distribution is
Pareto with tail parameter κ, lower bound z∗t > 1 and average productivity z̄t = κκ−1z
∗
t > 1.
8Note that this property does not hold if z∗t decreases over time, since the support of the time t
distribution will include values of z that were out of the support of the past distributions.
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3.5 Selection and free entry
Profits and firm’s value. Since F (z, `t) is homogeneous of degree one, it is easy to show
that net revenues π(z) of operative firms, as defined in (4), are linear in z at equilibrium, i.e.,
πt(z) = zF1(kt, 1) = zf ′(kt). (16)
This can be shown by substituting the first order condition for labor (5) and equilibrium wages
(6) in the profit function (4). Since net revenues correspond to the return to capital, they
are equal to the marginal product of aggregate capital per worker, f ′(kt), weighted by the
productivity of the firm, z, measuring the quality of firm’s capital.
At any time t, let us denote by τ(z), τ(z) ≥ 0, the time at which an incumbent firm with
productivity z, z ≥ z∗t , will endogenously exit. If z ≥ z∗t for all t ≥ 0, τ(z) =∞. Otherwise, it is
implicitly defined by the condition z = z∗τ , which is time invariant. Consequently, under Guess










(rh+δ)dh ds ≥ θ, (17)




rhdh, where rt is the equilibrium interest rate, and multiplied by the survival probability
eδ(t−s), where δ > 0 is the exogenous exit rate.
Exit condition. Firms with z ≤ z∗t exit and recover the scrap value θ, implying vt(z∗t ) = θ.
The following proposition characterizes the exit condition.
Proposition 3 Under Guess 1, the exit condition is
z∗t f
′(kt)− µ = (rt + δ)θ. (EC)
Proof : Differentiating (17) with respect to time, for t < τ(z), we get





For the marginal firm, v(z∗t ) = θ. Since z∗t is monotonically increasing, v̇(z∗t ) = 0. Consequently
z∗t f
′(kt)− µ = (rt + δ)θ,
which completes the proof.
The (EC) condition states that firms exit when current profits zf ′(kt) − µ are not large
enough to cover for the opportunity cost of the unit of capital owned by the firm, i.e., the
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Jorgenson [29] user cost of capital (rt + δ)θ. In which case, the firm closes down and recovers θ.
Since we are restricting the analysis to solutions where z∗t cannot decrease, the marginal firm
has no prospect of making any capital gain, implying that the condition vt(z∗t ) = θ collapses to
(EC).
Under partial reversibility, the degree of capital reversibility as measured by θ, affects the
incentives to exit by raising the user cost of capital, becoming a key determinant of the cutoff
productivity z∗. A larger degree of capital reversibility promotes exit by allowing firms to extract
a higher value from their scrapped capital. Equation (EC) is of particular relevance for the
arguments developed in Section 4 in the case of the Ramsey-Hopenhayn model, in which we will
assume µ equal to zero. In that case, condition (EC) reads




The return to capital when measured at the extensive margin is equal to the marginal product of
aggregate capital f ′(k) weighted by the ratio of the marginal quality of capital, z∗, to its scrap
value θ.
Free entry condition. With probability Ψ(z∗t ), a newly created firm draws a productivity
smaller than z∗t . In this case, not being able to generate enough profits to cover for the opportunity
cost of capital, the firm exits and recovers θ by sending its capital to scrap. With probability
1−Ψ(z∗t ) a newly created firm draws a productivity larger than z∗t getting as return the expected




. A firm is therefore indifferent between
entering and staying idle when the expected return equals the entry cost η. Consequently, the













As can be seen from equation (19), both a reduction in investment distortions, as measured by η,
and an increase in the degree of capital reversibility θ promote entry, the effect of θ being shaded
by the probability of failure Ψ(z∗). The following proposition uses Proposition 2 to simplify the
expected value of firms in this framework, unraveling the free entry condition (FE).
Proposition 4 If the initial distribution φι(z) = ψ(z)1−Ψ(z∗ι ) , for z ∈ [z
∗
ι , ζ̄), z∗ι ≥ ζ, under Guess
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) z̄tf ′(kt)− µ
rt + δ
= η. (FE)
Proof : From Proposition 2, equation (FE) becomes∫ ζ̄
z∗t
vt(z)ψ(z)dz = η − θΨ(z∗t ).
Differentiating it with respect to time
−vt(z∗t )ψ(z∗t )ż∗t +
∫ ζ̄
z∗t
v̇t(z)ψ(z)dz = −θψ(z∗t )ż∗t .

















−(1−Ψ(z∗t ))(z̄tf ′(kt)− µ) = 0,
which completes the proof.
From the exit condition, the value of being marginally successful v(z∗) is equal to the
opportunity cost θ of being unsuccessful. Consequently, over time, the expected change in the
value of successful firms
∫ ζ̄
z∗t
v̇t(z)ψ(z)dz is zero, implying that the expected value of being a




, is equal to the flow of profits of a firm making forever





Notice that the cost of creating a successful firm is η − θΨ(z∗), and 1−Ψ(z∗) is the probability
of being successful. In economies without investment distortions, the term multiplying r + δ is
larger than one, measuring the irreversibility premium suggested by Chirinko and Schaller [16].
Investment returns. The following proposition characterizes the returns to investment rt in
equilibrium.
Proposition 5 If the initial distribution φι(z) = ψ(z)1−Ψ(z∗ι ) , for z ∈ [z
∗
ι , ζ̄), z∗ι ≥ ζ, under Guess
1, and z∗0 ≥ z∗ι the equilibrium interest rate solves
η − θ =
(
1−Ψ(z∗t )




Proof : Substitute the (EC) condition into the (FE) condition to get
(rt + δ)(η − θ) = (1−Ψ(z∗t ))(z̄t − z∗t )f ′(kt),
which completes the proof.
Equation (R) epitomizes the fundamental tradeoff faced by the marginal incumbent firm
—the one with productivity z∗t . By paying the entry cost η and recovering the scrap value θ,
the marginal firm can exit and enter again. It will succeed in creating a profitable firm with
probability 1−Ψ(z∗). In this case, it expects to get an additional return from moving from z∗
to z̄. The equilibrium condition (R), which combines the free entry condition (FE) and the exit
condition (EC), can be interpreted as an arbitrage condition defining the return to investment,
encompassing firm’s creation and destruction. What really matters for selection is the ratio θ/η,
as we clearly see in Proposition 6.
Summary. One of the main technical problems faced when dealing with the dynamics of
heterogeneous firms models is that the equilibrium path critically depends on the value of firms,
and computing value functions requires information on the full equilibrium path. This paper
shows that by restricting the analysis to equilibria moving towards more selection, value functions
are not needed to compute the equilibrium path, drastically reducing the dimensionality of the
problem. The fundamental reason is the following. When the economy moves towards more
selection, the marginal firm knows that its profits cannot improve: when making zero profits,
future profits will never become positive again. Propositions 3 and 4 formalise this statement by
proving that for this family of solutions the conditions determining entry and exit only depend
on current profits.
4 Ramsey-Hopenhayn Model
This section analyzes the dynamic properties of the Ramsey-Hopenhayn model. Throughout, we
will assume strictly positive scrap values and zero fixed production costs, i.e., θ > 0 and µ = 0.
4.1 Equilibrium cutoff
When the initial distribution is the truncated entry distribution, truncated at a small enough
initial cutoff, Proposition 6 below shows that a time invariant equilibrium cutoff z∗t = z∗, ∀t ≥ 0,
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verifying Guess 1 exists and is unique. A direct implication of Proposition 6 is that, following a
permanent shock, the cutoff productivity jumps up to the new, higher steady state at the time of
the shock, and then remains constant forever. This situation typically arises when the economy
is initially at steady state and an unexpected shock induces more selection. These are the type
of condition that we will impose in Section 4.3 for the study of the transitional dynamics.
Proposition 6 If µ = 0, θ̂ = θ/η > ζ, and φι(z) = ψ(z)1−Ψ(z∗ι ) for z ∈ [z
∗
ι , ζ̄), z∗ι ∈ (ζ, z∗), there






zψ(z)dz + z∗Ψ(z∗). (20)
Proof : Under Guess 1 and µ = 0, equation (FE) in Proposition 4 becomes
(rt + δ)
(

















where θ̂ = θ/η. Add the term θ̂z∗t Ψ(z∗t ) to both sides, divide both sides by θ̂, and use the definition of z̄t






zψ(z)dz + z∗tΨ(z∗t ) ≡ A(z∗t ). (22)
The left-hand-side of (22) is linear on z∗t , crosses the origin and has slope 1/θ̂ > 1. Since the entry
distribution has unit mean, ζ < 1 and A(ζ) = 1. Moreover, the limz∗→ζ̄ A(z∗)/z∗ = 1, implying that
A(z∗) converges to the diagonal as z∗ goes to ζ̄. It is easy to see that A(z) crosses z/θ̂ at least once in
the interior of Z, which proves existence.
The first derivative of A(z) is
A′(z) = Ψ(z) ∈ (0, 1).
Since the slope of A(z) is smaller than the slope of z/θ̂ for all z ∈ Z, A(z) can only crosses z/θ̂ once,
showing that a unique solution verifying Guess 1 exists, which completes the proof.
At equilibrium, z∗ depends only on the parameters of the entry distribution ψ(z), and the
ratio of the degree of capital reversibility to the investment distortion, i.e. θ̂ = θ/η. Figure 1
provides a graphical representation of the existence and uniqueness of z∗.9 Since A(ζ) = 1, it
is easy to see that at equilibrium z∗ > θ̂. More importantly, as shown in Corollary 1 below,
9It is interesting to see that, differently from Melitz [38], no restriction is imposed on the entry







Figure 1: Determination of the cutoff productivity z∗
under the conditions of Proposition 6, when θ̂ increases z∗ grows proportionally more than θ̂.
Economies with a higher degree of capital reversibility θ or lower investment distortions η, on
top of being more efficient, are more selective, the effects of θ and η on z∗ being the mirror
image of each other.






Proof : Take logs and totally differentiate the equilibrium condition x/θ̂ = A(x), use the result above











which, by definition of A(x), is larger than 1. This completes the proof.
4.2 Aggregate Equilibrium
Feasible Allocations. With population normalized to one, per capita production results from




yt(z)φt(z)dz = F (kt, 1) ≡ f(kt). (23)
Aggregate technology is therefore Neoclassical and has the same functional form as the individual
firm’s technology. In addition, from equations (6) and (16), labor and capital are paid their
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marginal productivities, since wt = F2(kt, 1) and πt(z) = F1(kt, 1)z. The only relevant difference
with respect to a Neoclassical technology is that the average quality of capital, as measured by
z̄t, instead of being (normalized to) one is endogenous and increasing in selection.10 For the
same reason, capital measured at constant quality and consumption are different goods.11
On top of producing yt, the Ramsey-Hopenhayn economy recycles discarded capital. Since
capital is partially reversible, meaning that a fraction of its intrinsic content can be reverted
to the production process. Let us denote by st the stock of recycled capital available for
consumption or investment at time t. We model the recycling technology in line with the
modeling of the investment technology. In the continuous time Neoclassical growth model,
capital goods produced at time t become operative at time t+dt. This avoids the undesirable
possibility of producing capital that produce capital again and again at the same moment in
time. Similarly, in this paper, scrapped capital at time t is assumed to be recycled and used for
consumption or investment at time t+ dt. Otherwise, if it were used at time t scrapped capital
could be recycled and recycled again and again until it becomes productive enough to be used
in production.
How does scrapped capital cumulate into the stock of recycled capital st? Equation (24)
summarizes the recycling process under Guess 1:
ṡt = θ
(
Ψ(z∗t )et + φt(z∗t )ntż∗t
)
− st. (24)
Changes in recycled capital st is the outcome of three components. The first component pertains
to entries. In each period t, a fraction Ψ(z∗t ) of the et new firms draw a productivity level
z smaller than z∗t , and therefore decide to exit, sending their capital to scrap. The second
component relates to the evolution of the productivity cutoff z∗t which, under Guess 1, shifts
to the right. Therefore incumbent firms which productivity becomes smaller than the new z∗t
optimally close down sending their capital to scrap too. Accordingly, φt(z∗t )nt incumbent firms
endogenously exit at the rate ż∗t , ż∗t ≥ 0. The last term reflects the assumption that scrapped
capital recycled at time t reverts to the production process at time t+ dt.
10By differentiating z̄ in (15) with respect to z∗, it is easy to see that z̄ is increasing in z∗, implying
that average productivity increases with selection.
11It is important to note that yt measures per capita production in consumption units, which differs
from GDP as measured in National Accounts. However, when z∗t is time invariant, as it is the case in the
Ramsey-Hopenhayn model studied in this paper, the average quality of capital is time invariant, making
the relative price of capital and consumption become time invariant and easing aggregation.
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At any time t, the economy has a stock of capital kt = ntz̄t, producing f(kt), and a stock of
recycled capital st. Produced and recycled goods are consumed or invested, such that12
f(kt) + st = ct + ηet. (25)
The last term corresponds to investment. Each of the et new entrants acquires η consumption
goods to build the unit of capital required to start producing.
Finally, differentiating kt = z̄tnt with respect to t, substituting et from (25) and ṅt/nt from
(9), denoting γ̄t = ˙̄zt/z̄t, and using the definition of λt in (10), we obtain the following law of
motion for quality adjusted capital
k̇t = qt
(













As in Greenwood et al [23], qt in equation (27) measures the state of technology in the investment
sector, i.e., the rate at which one unit of the consumption good is turned into quality adjusted
capital.13 One unit of capital requires η units of the consumption good to be produced, becoming
operative with probability 1−Ψ(z∗t ), and having expected quality z̄t.
Under the conditions of Proposition 6, z∗t is constant at equilibrium. Let us denote this




















/η being time invariant. Given a stock of capital kt and a stock of recycled
capital st, (FCrh) and (SC) describe the feasible set of consumption, ct, net (quality adjusted)
investment, k̇t, and the creation of recycled capital ṡt.
12We define gross investment as ηe − s following the Measuring Capital OECD Manual (https:
//www.oecd.org/sdd/productivity-stats/43734711.pdf). The manual states that “GFCF is defined
as the acquisition, less disposals, of fixed assets. . . The assets acquired may be new or they may be used
assets that are traded on second-hand markets. The assets disposed of may be sold for continued use by
another economic unit, they may be simply abandoned by the owner or they may be sold as scrap and be
broken down into reusable components, recoverable materials, or waste products.” (p. 124)
13An economy where the equilibrium distribution of capital quality were permanently moving to the
right at a constant rate will feature investment specific technical change as in Greenwood et al [23].
24
Equilibrium Aggregates. Under the conditions of Proposition 6, for a given equilibrium
cutoff productivity z∗, a given equilibrium distribution φ(z) = ψ(z)/(1−Ψ(z∗), and given initial





f ′(kt)− ρ− δ
)
k̇t = q (f(kt) + st − ct)− δkt
ṡt = θ̂Ψ(z∗) (f(kt) + st − ct)− st.
(RH)
The first condition results from substituting the equilibrium interest rate rt from (EC) into the
household’s Euler equation (2). This is therefore a standard Euler equation where the interest
rate corresponds to the return of the marginal firm z∗. The other two conditions were derived
just above. As it will become clear in Section 4.3, selection affects the initial conditions k0 and
s0, since a jump in z∗ at the initial time suddenly destroys capital, cutting the capital stock
down and increasing the stock of recycled capital.
Stationary Equilibrium. In a steady state equilibrium, the path for {ct, kt, st} is time
invariant. Imposing stationarity to the equilibrium conditions in (RH) above, the stationary
values of c and k are given by









Since more selective economies have a lower θ/z∗, they also have a larger steady state stock of
capital. Moreover, the effective depreciation rate also decreases with selection, meaning that
the gains in quality more than compensate the cost of recycling capital, making the effective
depreciation rate smaller than δ —the physical depreciation rate.








At any time t, a fraction δ of firms is replaced and a fraction Ψ(z∗) of their physical capital is
sent to scrap and recycled at the rate θ. The multiplier
(
1−Ψ(z∗)
)−1 reflects the fact that, in
period t+ dt, recycled capital is also subject to selection, scrapping and recycling.
In the following section, we implement separate, permanent shocks to the degree of capital
reversibility θ and the investment distortions η, both shocks delivering exactly the same increase
14A standard transversality condition must be added to the definition of equilibrium.
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in the cutoff z∗. As can be seen by inspecting the stationary equilibrium system (RHss), the
effect on the aggregates of these shocks differ substantially. Investment distortions have no
direct effect on the stationary value of the aggregates, the effect operating through z∗ only. By
contrast, increasing capital reversibility directly raises the marginal product of capital and the
depreciation rate at the stationary equilibrium, even if, as shown in Corollary 1, the indirect
effect through selection dominates. The additional negative effect on capital and consumption
partially compensates the indirect positive effect of selection through z∗. The differential effect
of θ and η is fundamentally due to the fact that a reduction in investment distortions promote
entry, whereas an increase in capital reversibility promotes exit. Both hence have opposite effects
on the equilibrium mass of firms, which increases following a decline in η and reduces following
an increase in θ.
4.3 Transitional Dynamics
In this section, we consider a baseline economy facing both investment distortions and partial
capital irreversibility. We analyze the effects of reducing these distortions on the equilibrium
system (RH).
Let us assume the entry distribution is Pareto with tail parameter κ > 1 and lower bound
ζ = κ−1κ , the production technology is Cobb-Douglas, f(k) = Ak
α with A > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1).
The economy was in steady state before t = 0, with investment distortion ηι > 1 and degree of
partial reversibility θι < 1, where index ι refers to the past steady state equilibrium. There exists




























It is easy to see that a permanent productivity shock raising A will have the same effect
as in the baseline Neoclassical growth model irrespective of the degree of capital irreversibility
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and innovation distortions.15 Since z∗ does not depend on any parameter of the production
technology, changes in A have no effect on selection.16
Let us now analyze the effects of taming down the bite of the distortions in this economy.
More precisely, let us assume that at time t = 0 capital becomes more reversible or investment
distortions abridge. More formally, from t = 0 the degree of capital reversibility becomes θ > θι
or, alternatively, investment distortions become η < ηι. The size of the shock is such that the
new θ and η produce the same z∗.
From (20), for all t ≥ 0, z∗t = z∗ > z∗ι . Consequently, the equilibrium distribution is








z−κ−1, for z ≥ z∗ and the average productivity is
z̄t = z̄ = κ1−κz
∗. The change in the equilibrium distribution is depicted in Figure 2, where the
cutoff productivity is seen to shift to the right (right shift in the vertical gray line).
Figure 2: Distribution of Firms: log(φ(z))










At initial steady state, At final steady state.





z̄ < nιz̄ι = kι.
The increase in the stock of recycled capital depends on type of shock, with θ̃ ∈ {θ, θι},
s0 = sι + θ̃ nιΦι(z∗) > sι.
Selection hence operates as a negative shock on the initial stock of capital. Even if the average
productivity of capital goes up, it does so at the price of destroying a fraction of the existing
capital stock. The associated obsolescence cost results from firms closing down and sending their
machines to scrap, as witnessed by the increase in s0 with respect to sι.
15See King and Rebelo [31].
16This result is in line with Veracierto (2002) showing “that investment irreversibilities do not play a
significant role in an otherwise standard real business-cycle model.”
27
The solution for the aggregates is a path {ct, kt, st}, for t ≥ 0, that solves (RH) given the
initial conditions k0 and s0 above, and the equilibrium solution for z∗.
Figure 3 illustrates these dynamics. Our benchmark parametrization,17 as reported in Table
1, assumes, without loss of generality, a unit scaling parameter A. Households are assumed to
discount the future with a discount rate, ρ, of 5% and have preferences characterized by a unit
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (σ = 1). The Pareto tail parameter is set to 1.5, which
lies in the range of estimated values in the empirical literature (see [?], [39], [26] among others).
Investment distorsions are such that it takes 1.2 units of the consumption good to build a unit
of capital, (η = 1.2). The parameters θ, α and δ are then set such that the model generates a
consumption share of 0.8, a capital to output ratio of 3, and a capital income share of 0.35. We
then engineer a one shot 2.66% (resp. 2.6%) permanent increase (resp. decrease) in θ (resp. η)
to generate the 5% permanent increase in z∗ reported in Figure 2. A 5% increase in the average
quality of capital, with α = 0.35 is equivalent to a 1.7% (permanent) TFP shock.
Table 1: Parameters
Preferences Technology
ρ σ A α δ κ η θ
0.050 1.000 1.000 0.350 0.066 1.500 1.200 0.758
As can be observed from Figure 3, the increase in selection induced by both shocks improves
the steady state average quality of capital, raising production and consumption in the long
run. An increase in capital reversibility promotes additional exit, reducing the mass of firms at
the new stationary equilibrium. As shown in Corollary 1, the increase in average productivity
more than compensates the decline in the mass of firm, increasing (quality adjusted) capital at
steady state, but increasing it by less than the 5% gain in average productivity. A reduction
in investment distortions, by contrast, by promoting entry increases the mass of firms, making
the increase in capital, output and consumption be twice as large as the one resulting from the
equivalent increase in capital reversibility.
Both shocks, by increasing selection, exerts an identical initial negative effect on the capital
17Although this exercise does not pretend to constitute a full fledged calibration of the model, the
values of the parameters were set in lines with previous studies that undertook a proper calibration of a
model of firm dynamics.
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Figure 3: Transition Dynamics (Ramsey-Hopenhayn Model)
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Permanent increase in θ, Permanent decrease in η.
stock, hereby reducing output. Since the economy becomes more selective, the less productive
firms exit the market, thereby reducing the initial stock of capital both in physical and quality
adjusted units, as measured by nt and kt, by around 7% and 2%, respectively. A reduction in η
has the additional effect of reducing the cost of creating new firms, which remains unaffected by
an increase in θ.
Even if the incentives are there for new, more productive firms to be created, the creation
process takes time and requires new costly investments. Consequently, consumption initially
reduces even more than capital to allow for a larger entry of firms. This effect is stronger in
the case of a reduction in investment distortions —since it promotes entry— relative to an
improvement in capital reversibility —since it induces more exit. The effects on scrapping are,
however, quite similar.
In order to evaluate the consumption equivalent welfare gains and losses from selection, let us
define the welfare gain of an increase in θ or a reduction in η as the extra permanent percentage
consumption, ∆c, the representative individual should be given in order to be indifferent between





















where cι represents steady state consumption before the change in θ or η, and ct is the post-change
consumption path.
As can be observed from Figure 4, total and steady state welfare gains from mitigating
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Figure 4: Welfare Gains (Ramsey-Hopenhayn Model)
(a) Permanent increase in θ






















(b) Permanent decrease in η



















investment distortions and alleviating capital irreversibilities are of first order. Mitigating
investment distortions generate welfare gains that are twice as large as the gains from alleviating
capital irreversibilities. A 5% increase in selection, that permanently raises TFP by 1.7%,
generates total welfare gains of around 1.07% or 0.42%, depending on selection being enhanced
through shocks that directly affect creation/entry or destruction/exit, respectively. Steady state
welfare gains are between three and two and a half times as larger as total gains, with losses
produced by the initial capital destruction accounting for 60% to 65% of the long term welfare
gains from selection.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ does not affect the steady state equilibrium
for {c, k, z∗} and φ(z), neither the initial drop on capital from kι to k0, but the initial drop in
consumption and the velocity of convergence from k0 to the new steady state. For this motive,
it is interesting to see how welfare gains depend on σ. As expected, steady state welfare gains
are positive and invariant with respect to σ, as illustrated by the middle panel of Figure 4, since
the steady state consumption path does not depend on it. Moreover, the lower σ is, the closer
the initial consumption will be to its steady state value, reducing the welfare cost of the initial
capital destruction emerging from selection. As shown in Figure 4, for our particular example,
the additional losses associated to an increase in σ are small.
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4.4 Instantaneous Recycling
In Section 4.2, we assume there is a recycling technology transforming one unit of capital
discarded at time t into θ units of the final good, θ < 1, which can be consumed or invested at
t+dt. In this section, we explore the alternative assumption that discarded capital is recycled
and used again at period t, which is the standard assumption regarding the working of secondary
markets. Al along this subsection, Proposition 6 holds, implying that an equilibrium exists with
constant cutoff productivity z∗. Let us also assume the economy was at a steady state up to the
initial time, implying that Proposition 2 also holds and the equilibrium distribution φ(z) is the
entry distribution truncated at the constant equilibrium cutoff z∗.
Feasibility condition. In this context, condition 25 becomes





where the last term represents gross investment net of recycled capital, which as assumed just
above instantaneously revert to the production process.









η − θΨ(z∗) z̄.
The rate at which one unit of the consumption good is turned into quality adjusted capital
positively depend on the average quality of capital z̄ and on the scarp value of capital θ, but
negatively on the investment distortion η and on the cutoff productivity z∗.
Equilibrium. Under the conditions of Proposition 6, for a given equilibrium cutoff z∗, a given
equilibrium distribution φ(z) = ψ(z)/(1−Ψ(z∗), and given initial conditions k0 > 0 and s0 > 0,





f ′(kt)− ρ− δ
)
k̇t = q (f(kt)− ct)− δkt.
(IR)
18A standard transversality condition must be added to the definition of equilibrium.
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The first condition results as before from substituting the equilibrium interest rate rt from (EC)
into the household’s Euler equation (2).
The stationary solution for {c, k} is identical to the solution in Section 4.2, i.e.,



























The second term in parenthesis represents the instantaneous recycling of the scrapped initial
capital. Differently from Section 4.3, if the shock moves θ̂ close enough to one, the initial
reduction in the mass of firms maybe more than compensated by the increase in the average
productivity z̄, in which case selection will generate an initial creation of capital instead of an
initial destruction. It is easy to see in equation (30) that this is the case when θ̂ approaches one,
since in this case k0 approaches nιz̄ with z̄ > z̄ι.19
The dynamic properties of the RH economy with instantaneous delays are the same as
the properties of the Neoclassical model. It is interesting to notice that for η = 1 and θ = ζ,
there is no selection since z∗ = ζ. In this case z∗/θ = q = 1, making the equilibrium of the
Ramsey-Hopenhayn economy under instantaneous recycling, as represented by (IR), be the
Neoclassical model with initial condition k0. If η > 1, θ > ζ, and θ/η > ζ, then θ/z∗ < 1
and q > 1. Selection makes capital and consumption to be larger in the RH economy with
instantaneous recycling relative to the Neoclassical economy.
Transitional dynamics. Let us set the same parameters as in Table 1, and introduce the same
shocks as in Section 4.3. The transitional dynamics is represented in Figure 5. By comparing
Figures 3 and 5, we can see that the RH economy with instantaneous recycling moves from
the same initial to the same final steady state equilibrium as in the RH economy (with delayed
recycling) of Section 4.3. The fundamental difference is, as we can see in Figure 5, that capital
destruction flips to capital creation since instantaneous recycling allows for an increase of capital
19In the degenerate case θ̂ = 1, the cost of recycling is zero, then firms will instantaneously recycle
until they get the maximum productivity ζ.
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quality that overpass the initial reduction in the number of firms. Consequently, capital, output,
consumption and gross investment (as represented by firms’ entry) converge to the same steady
state but starting from a higher level.
Figure 5: Transition Dynamics (Instantaneous Recycling Model)
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Permanent increase in θ, Permanent decrease in η.
By comparing Figures 4 with 6, it can be observed that stationary welfare gains are the
same, irrespective of recycling being delayed or instantaneous. The cost of the transition are
much smaller when recycling is instantaneous representing, representing around 35% of steady
state welfare gains. Since there is capital creation, the role of σ on shaping transitional flips
compared to the model with delayed recycling. Smaller σ is, longer it takes to reach the new
steady state, generating larger transitional loses. Notice that this relation was broken in Figure
4 due to initial capital destruction.
5 Hopenhayn Model
This paper studies a simplified version of Hopenhayn [24] where firm’s productivity, in the spirit
of Melitz [38], is time invariant. It corresponds to the general framework in Section 3, by setting
θ = 0 and µ > 0. As we show in this section, differently from the Ramsey-Hopenhayn model,
when the Hopenhayn economy faces a permanent decline in the investment distortion η, the
cutoff productivity does not jump upward but monotonically converges to the new steady state
with more selection. As in the previous section, and for comparison purposes, we restrict the
analysis of the Hopenhayn model to the particular case of a Pareto entry distribution and a
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Figure 6: Welfare Gains (Instantaneous Recycling Model)
(a) Permanent increase in θ

























(b) Permanent decrease in η




















Let us interpret kt here as the aggregate stock of intangible capital. The creation of a firm
involves some fully irreversible intangible investment, normalized here to one. This investment
makes technology F (z, `) available to the firm, which value depends on productivity z. At any
time t, nt of these technologies are operative with average productivity z̄t, implying an aggregate
stock of intangibles equal to kt = ntz̄t.




t = µ, (ECh)
relating the cutoff productivity to the marginal product of intangible capital. Under Guess 1
the marginal firm has indeed no prospect of generating any capital gain.
The entry and exit process, as represented by equation (R), becomes(
1−Ψ(z∗t )
)(z̄t − z∗t ) αAkα−1t
rt + δ
= η.
From (ECh) and the additional assumption that the entry distribution is Pareto, the equilibrium
interest rate as described by (R) becomes









η(κ− 1) µ. (Rh)
Decreasing returns to capital are consequently at work. In addition, and differently from the
RH model, the equilibrium cutoff moves one-to-one with the real interest rate. An increase in
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z∗, Ceteris Paribus, reduces the probability 1−Ψ(z∗t ) of being successful, lowering the return to
entry.
Equilibrium Aggregates. At any time t, the economy has a stock of intangible capital
kt = ntz̄t, which produces Akαt . Some production is allocated to cover the fixed production cost,
the remaining is consumed or invested according to
Akαt − µnt︸ ︷︷ ︸
GDP
= ct + ηet (31)
where et is entry, measuring investment in physical units. Fixed production costs need to be
subtracted from production to get a value added measure of GDP, which then is allocated to
consumption and investment. Differently from the Ramsey-Hopenhayn model, the stock of
recycled capital is zero, since intangible capital is fully irreversible.
The following proposition characterizes the dynamics of the Hopenhayn model, which
differently from the Ramsey-Hopenhayn model.
Proposition 7 Under Guess 1, an initial distribution φι(z) = ψ(z)1−Ψ(z∗ι ) , for z ∈ [z
∗
ι , ζ̄), z∗ι > ζ,





, κ > 1 and ζ > 0, and a Cobb-Douglas production
function f(k) = kα, α ∈ (0, 1), the feasibility condition becomes















η(κ− 1)(κ+ α− κα) , δ̂0 =
δ
κ+ α− κα and δ̂1 =
ζκ(αA)κµ1−κ
η(κ+ α− κα) .
Proof : From the definition of kt,
k̇t = ṅtz̄t + nt ˙̄zt.
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Under the assumption that the entry distribution is Pareto with tail parameter κ and after substitution
of the (ECh) condition above, the last equation becomes (FCh), which completes the proof.
At equilibrium, the feasibility condition FCh represents the evolution law of the stock of
intangible capital. The intangible investment technology transforms one unit of the consumption
into q̂ k(α−1)(κ−1)t units of intangible capital, which, due to destruction and obsolescence,
depreciates at rate dt = δ̂0 + δ̂1kκ(α−1)t .
Under the assumption that the entry distribution is Pareto and the production technology is
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and q̂, δ̂0 and δ̂1 as defined above.
The first condition results from substituting the equilibrium interest rate rt from Lemma 5
into the Euler equation (2). The second condition was derived in Proposition 7. Saddle path
stability is shown in the Appendix A.
Finally, given the equilibrium path for kt, the (ECh) condition determines the equilibrium
path for z∗t .







c = βAκ k












ηδ, and β = α+ κ− ακ. Note that z∗ > ζ at steady state iff
µ > (δ+ ρ)η(κ− 1). A decline in innovation distortions η increases selection, the stock of capital
(when measured in quality units) and consumption per capita at steady state since producing
capital is cheaper.
20A transversality condition has to be added to the definition of equilibrium.
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Transitional Dynamics. In this case, we set θ = 0 and maintain all parameter values used
in the previous section. The fixed cost parameter µ is set such the Hopenhayn model generates
the same threshold z∗ as in the Ramsey-Hopenhayn model, leading to set µ = 0.24. We then
engineer a 7.05% permanent reduction in η such that the threshold z∗ increase permanently by
5%. Figure 7 reports the implied transition dynamics, Figure 8 reports the welfare gains.
Figure 7: Transition Dynamics (Hopenhayn Model)
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Figure 8: Welfare Gains (Hopenhayn Model)


















Differently from the RH model, the cutoff and average productivities do not jump at t = 0,
but monotonically converge to the new steady state, implying that there is no destruction of
intangible capital at the time of the shock. An increase in selection raises the steady state value of
capital, which as in the Neoclassical growth model, converges monotonically to its new long run
value starting from its past value. As can be observed from Figure 7, output and consumption
also follow a standard pattern. Intangible investments as represented by entry follow a standard
pattern too. Figure 7 also depicts the behavior of the depreciation rate of intangible capital dt.
In the transition, the cutoff productivity z∗t monotonically increases, making the marginal firm
exit, which destroys its intangible capital.
Steady state welfare gains of raising selection by 5% through a reduction in investment
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distortions are very similar in both the Hopenhayn and the Ramsey-Hopenhayn model. However,
the cost of transition is 20% larger in the Ramsey-Hopenhayn model due to the initial intangible
capital destruction.
6 Endogenous Growth
Following Jones and Manuelli [28], this section adds to technology F (z, `) in (3) an AK term in
line with the literature on learning-by-doing (LBD) —see Arrow [6]. To simplify the argument,







A > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1). The new term Ak1−α is a LBD knowledge spillover. Under µ = 0, all
previous results for z∗ in Section 4 hold, implying that all along the equilibrium path z∗t = z∗
independent of the aggregates, and φt(z) is the entry distribution truncated at z∗. Following




























































/η is defined as in Section 4.2. Notice that if there were no selection,
z∗/θ = q = 1, and no recycling, s = 0, then g = σ (αA− ρ− δ) and c =
(
A− δ − g)k as in the
standard LBD model of endogenous growth.
As in Section 4.3, let us assume the entry distribution is Pareto with tail parameter κ > 1
and lower bound ζ = κ−1κ . Let the economy be in a balanced growth path before t = 0, with
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investment distortion ηι > 1 and degree of partial reversibility θι < 1. The past cutoff productivity









for z ≥ z∗ι . The past number of firms is nι, nι > 0, the corresponding past stock of capital is





As we did in Section 4.3, let us assume that from t = 0 the degree of capital reversibility
becomes θ > θι or, alternatively, investment distortions become η < ηι. The size of the shock
is such that the new θ and η produce the same z∗. From (20), for all t ≥ 0, z∗t = z∗ > z∗ι .









for z ≥ z∗ and the average productivity is z̄t = z̄ = κ1−κz
∗.





z̄ < nιz̄ι = kι.
The increase in the stock of recycled capital depends on type of shock, with θ̃ ∈ {θ, θι},
s0 = sι + θ̃ nιΦι(z∗) > sι.
As in the Ramsey-Hopenhayn model, selection operates as a negative shock on the initial stock
of capital.
Table 2: Parameters (Endogenous Growth)
Preferences Technology
ρ σ A α δ κ η θ
0.050 1.000 0.333 0.350 0.066 1.500 1.200 0.876
For the simulation exercise, calibrated parameters are in Table 2. They are set equal to
the corresponding parameters in Table 1 with the exception of θ and A that are recalibrated
to the growth rate be 2% and the capital to output ratio be three, respectively. As before, the
permanent shocks on θ and η are designed to increase z∗ by 5%. Selection, by increasing the
marginal product of capital, makes the economy to grow faster. From equation (33), it becomes
21As usual in endogenous growth models, the stock of capital at the balanced growth path is indetermi-
nate, meaning that kι may take any arbitrary value.
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clear that the η shock has a larger growth effect than the corresponding θ shock. This differential
effect can be easily observed in Figure 9, which represents deviation (in logs) to the initial
balanced growth path. The simulated permanent reduction in investment distortions increases
annual growth by around 0.685 percent points, but the equivalent increase in reversibility raises
it by 0.333. Initial capital destruction, both in physical (number of machines) and quality units
(kt), reduces the stock of capital at the time of the shock, but the increase in the growth rate
makes both measures of capital to overpass the previous trend on a few years. Consumption
and output follow.

















































Steady state welfare gains, as measured in consumption equivalent, are of 5.99% and 11.37%
for the θ and η shocks, respectively. When compared to the welfare gains in the RH model, the
growth effect of selection multiplies welfare gains by the order of four. The cost of the transition
is similar than before, but in relative terms much smaller for all values of σ in (0,2) (for this
reason, we decided not to include a Figure).
7 Conclusions
This paper proposes a simple modelling strategy allowing for easily solving the equilibrium path of
dynamic general equilibrium economies with heterogenous firms à la Melitz [38]. This modelling
strategy applies to economies transiting towards a more selective equilibrium. The easiness of
the approach relies on the key result that, an economy transiting towards a more selective steady
state equilibrium, at any time the equilibrium distribution is the entry distribution truncated at
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the current productivity cutoff. One of the main advantages of the approach is that it allows for
an easy evaluation of the welfare costs of the transition, in particular when selection requires
an initial destruction of the capital stock. We find that welfare gains from selection are of first
order but the transition generates welfare losses of around 60% of the steady state welfare gains.
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A Stability Hopenhayn Model







t − δ − ρ
)










where a, q̂, δ̂0 and δ̂1 as defined in Section 5.














The k̇t = 0 locus is
c(k) = βA
κ
kα − δ̃0 kβ,
with α ∈ (0, 1) and β > 1. Properties of the k̇t = 0 locus:





κ(1−α) . Let us
assume kι < kmax.
• The first derivative is
c′(k) = αβA
κ
kα−1 − βδ̃0 kβ−1.
s.t.
– lim c′(k)k→0+ = +∞.
– Golden rule: there exits kg such that c′(kg) = 0, with kg = (α/β)
1
κ(1−α) gmax < gmax.
























κ(δ + ρ) q̂
) 1
κ(1−α)
⇐⇒ ρ > 0
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• The second derivative is
c′′(k) = (α− 1)αβA
κ
kα−2 − (β − 1)βδ̃0 kβ−2 < 0.
Figure 10 depicts the phase diagram associated to the dynamic system, which exhibits
saddle-path stability.










t − δ − ρ
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Linearizing the system around the steady state, and using the steady state restrictions, we get ˙̂kt
˙̂ct
 =
 δ0 + ρ+ δ − κ(ρ+δ)α(κ+α−ακ) k∗y∗







where x̂t ≡ xt − x∗. The determinant of the matrix J is given by






such that the product of the 2 eigenvalues is negative. The steady state is therefore (locally)
saddle path stable.
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B Endogenous Growth Model








taking wt as given. From the first-order-condition for labor, following the same steps as in the
main text, the labor market clearing condition implies an equilibrium wage wt = (1−α)(kα+Ak)
and an equilibrium labor demand `t(z) = zkt . Substituting the equilibrium labor demand in the






Aggregating over all firms, we get the Jones and Manuelli [28] aggregate technology
yt = kαt +Akt.












z∗ = (rt + δ)θ (EC)
Recycled capital follows
ṡt = θΨ(z∗)et − st.
with
f(kt) + st = ct + ηet.
Finally, following similar steps as in the main text
k̇t = q
(
kαt +Akt + st − ct
)
− δkt, (34)









Ramsey-Hopenhayn Model. Parameters κ and ρ are set to standard values. η is also set.
The calibration aims at selecting α, δ and θ such that at steady state the capital to output ratio,
the share of consumption in GDP and the share of capital on total income are equal to ko, co
and rko, respectively.
The capital to output ratio and the share of consumption are
k1−α = ko and ck−α = co.




= (ρ+ δ) k1−α︸ ︷︷ ︸
ko
= rko, ⇒ δ = rkoko − ρ.







⇒ z∗ = δ ko1− co θ.
Substitute z∗ in the (EC) condition, assuming µ = 0, to solve for α
z∗αkα−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
ko−1
= (ρ+ δ)θ ⇒ α = (1− co) ρ+ δ
δ
Finally, use z̄ = κκ−1z












κ− 1 . (R)
Hopenhayn Model. Parameters κ and ρ are set to standard values. There is full irreversibility,
i.e., θ = 0. The calibration aims at selecting α, δ, µ and η such that at steady state the capital
to output ratio, the share of consumption in GDP , the share of capital on total income and the
cutoff productivity z∗ are equal to ko, co, ro and Z∗, respectively.
Parameter δ is set using the same procedure as in the RH model. The stationary equilibrium







Use the previous condition to substitute for e in the feasibility condition, which then reads
c = kα − µn− ηe ⇒ c






= 1− ηδ z̄1−Ψ(z∗) ko.
Consequently

























Substitute (EC) into the (R) condition to get the ratio
µ
η
= (κ− 1)(ρ+ δ)1−Ψ(z∗) . (36)























+ µ = 1− co
z̄ ko−1
(37)
Combine (35), (36) and (37) to solve for µ, η and α.
D Scrapping
The stock of recycled capital moves from any time t to t+ h, h > 0, according to (we exlude(
δt − δ
)
nt to simplify the presentation of the main argument)















which is equivalent to










where 1− θψ(z∗t ) is the rate at which the stock st of recycled capital transform into new capital,
exiting from st. Notice that 1− θψ(z∗t ) is equivalent to depreciation rate δ in the law of motion
for capital.
Then, divide by h and take the limit when h→ 0, to get
ṡt = θΨ(z∗t )et − st. (SC)
E Full Reversibility
Let us assume θ = η, δ = 0, and the upper-bound of the entry distribution ζ̄ <∞.
1. From Proposition 3, z∗ = ζ̄. It will be equal to infinity is the entry distribution were
unbounded.
2. From Proposition 2, the equilibrium distribution degenerates with all the mass in ζ̄. If the
entry distribution were unbounded, the equilibrium distribution will polarize, with mass
moving to the right.
3. At SS, from Section 3.4,
f ′(k) = ρ
ζ̄
,
implying that the stationary capital reaches is maximum possible value, which is finite. In
the case the entry distribution is unbounded, kt will go to infinity.
4. Indeed, from Section 3.4, the initial value of capital is k0 = 0. Then, the economy will jump
to the stationary equilibrium with zero capital remaining trapped in the zero equilibrium
forever. This cannot be optimal!!! (Notice, on top of it, that from Proposition 4, k̇t = 0)
Converging to full reversibility. The interesting equilibrium is the one where there is no
jump on θ, but it moves continuously from θι to η, η = 1.
1. Use Proposition 3 to solve for z∗t . Remind that the equilibrium distribution is given by
Proposition 2.
2. Since there is no jump on θ at t = 0, there is no jump on z∗, which implies that k0 = kι and
s0 = sι.
3. Use (EE-FC-SC) to solve for ct, kt and st.
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In this case, since θ monotonically converges to η = 1, z∗ monotonically converges to ζ̄. Since
there is no depreciation, the equilibrium distribution monotonically converges to the degenerate
distribution (all the mass concentrated in ζ̄). I expect to see that kt monotonically converges to
the new steady state instead of converging to zero.
Permanent growth. Let us assume that ζ̄ =∞. Concerning θt, notice the following. Totally
differentiate (EC-FE”) to get
dz∗t
z∗t












Notice that when θt converges to one, since z∗t converges to infinity
Use the Pareto distribution and the assumption that z∗t grow at the rate γ to rewrite it as a










Of course, a similar exercise could be performed in an economy with θ = 1 and ηι > 1 with
η monotonically converging to 1.
F RH with Instantaneous Recycling
We could have alternatively assumed that scrapped capital at t is recycled at t, instead of t+dt.
In which case, under Proposition 6, the efficiency condition (25) becomes

















η − θΨ(z∗) .
Notice that under this alternative assumption, the feasibility condition is identical to the
feasibility condition of the Neoclassical model apart from qh being different from one. Indeed,
under this assumption st = 0 for all t.
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Under the alternative assumption that recycled capital is currently used for consumption
or investment, for a given equilibrium cutoff productivity z∗, a given equilibrium distribution


















∗/θ > 1. The last equality results from operating in equation (21).
This economy has the same properties as the Neoclassical model, but the marginal product of
capital and the rate transforming consumption goods into investment endogenously depend on
selection, being both equal to z∗/θ. Indeed, an economy with selection is more efficient than the
Neoclassical economy. First, as stated in Proposition 6 and Corollary 1, z∗/θ is larger than one
and increasing in selection, meaning that capital is more productive in more selective economies,
raising the equilibrium interest rate and the growth rate of consumption. Second, even when
consumption transform into physical capital at the rate 1/η < 1, it transforms into adjusted
capital at a rate larger than one, increasing with selection. Remind that in the Neoclassical
model, the interest rate is equal to the marginal product of capital (minus the depreciation rate)
and consumption transform into capital at rate 1/η.
The equilibrium path in (Rh) has the same structure than in Greenwood et al [23]. In both
models consumption and capital are different goods, consumption transforming into capital at
rate qh. Indeed, in Greenwood et al [23], qh is growing at the investment specific or embodied
rate of technical progress. In our model, qh is constant but endogenously determined by selection.
As in the the Ramsey-Hopenhayn model, the stationary values of c and k become





c = f(k)− θ
z∗
δk.
Notice that a shock to selection could be modeled in the framework of the Neoclassical growth
model as an investment specific technical shock. The only difference between the two models
comes from the effect of selection on initial capital that we study just below. As we show below,
under the assumptions in this appendix, selection in facts increases the initial stock of capital
making the economy even more efficient.
In order to simulate the dynamic system (RH) under the same shocks as in Section 4.3, the
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> nιz̄ι = kι.
Given that scrapped capital may be recycled within the period again and again, more selection
makes k0 > kι. The interaction between the entry and exit conditions makes that the expected
productivity of scrapped capital becomes z∗ at equilibrium. The larger productivity of the
recycled capital units more than compensate the destruction associated to scrapping.
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